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Este trabajo presenta evidencia microeconómica sobre el grado de rigidez laboral a la 
baja en Chile y explora sus consecuencias en términos de empleo. Se utiliza un nuevo 
panel de datos que comprende información de 440 mil historias de salarios para el 
período 2001.12-2007.12. Los resultados indican un bajo nivel de flexibilidad laboral, 
siendo la frecuencia de los ajustes de salarios en la economía de alrededor de nueve 
trimestres. En cuanto a los determinantes de la rigidez salarial, el grado de flexibilidad 
depende negativamente del tamaño de la empresa, del porcentaje de trabajadores 
mujeres, de la edad de los trabajadores y de la participación de trabajadores calificados 
a nivel de la empresa. Las estimaciones econométricas indican que una consecuencia 








This paper presents micro evidence on the degree of downward nominal wage rigidity 
in Chile and also explores its consequences in terms of employment. The data used 
corresponds to a new panel based on 440 thousand wage histories for the period 
2001.12-2007.12. The results indicate a low degree of wage flexibility, the estimated 
length of wage adjustment for the whole economy being around nine quarters. In terms 
of the determinants of wage rigidity, the degree of flexibility depends negatively on the 
size of the firm, the percentage of female workers, the age of workers and white-collar 
participation at firm level. The econometric estimations indicate that the direct 
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1. Introduction  
This paper provides evidence on the degree of downward nominal wage rigidity 
in Chile.  We use micro data from the Asociación Chilena de Seguridad 
(ACHS)
1 to build a panel of 440 thousand wage histories
2 for the period 2001.12-
2007.12. This database identifies the firm and industry to which workers belong 
their personal characteristics, gender and age.  
 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper of its kind for the Chilean 
case
3. This situation contrasts with the growing interest in this subject at an 
international level - based to a large extent on the increasing availability of 
individual and firm-level data
4 - and its relevance for monetary policy.  With 
this in mind, this paper aims to provide some insights into wage dynamics for 
Chile.  In terms of the methodology, the potential measurement error of wages 
is dealt with by using the econometric technique of structural break detection 
developed by Bai and Perron (2003). This approach has been applied for the 
labour market in the U.S. by Gottschalk (2005) and it relies on the assumption 
that nominal wages change in a discrete fashion.  
 
The main result is that Chile shows a relatively low degree of wage flexibility. 
The average length of time that it would take for the whole economy to adjust 
its wages is just over nine quarters, with some differences between economic 
sectors. The econometric estimation of the determinants of downward nominal 
wage rigidity shows that this depends negatively on firm size, the percentage of 
female workers, workers ages and white-collar participation at firm level.  The 
impact of downward nominal wage rigidity on employment is a higher 
contraction of employment during bad times and, in general, a higher co-
movement with the economic cycle.  In other words, firms use employment to 
compensate for wage inflexibility.  
                                                 
1 The Asociación Chilena de Seguridad is a private non-profit organization that develops risk prevention programs and 
gives health coverage to its affiliates in case of a work accident. Workers affiliated to the AChS account for 
approximately 35% of total wage earning workers. 
2 We build 440 thousand wage stories, resulting in a monthly average of 336 thousand workers. 
3 Jadresic (1992) uses aggregated data to identify wage rigidity for the Chilean case. 
4 This point is illustrated by the conference on wage dynamics organized by European Central Bank on June 24
th and 
25
th, 2008; and the International Wage Flexibility project – Dickens et al (2007) summarizes the main findings of this 
project.   2 
 
The rest of the document consists of 4 sections. Section 2 provides a review of 
the literature available for other countries. Section 3 describes the database 
used. Section 4 provides estimates of how flexible wages are in Chile, and also 
provides an analysis of the determinants and consequences of such adjustments. 
Section 5 summarizes the main findings of the study. 
2. International Evidence 
The most recent studies on wage rigidities have been addressed primarily 
through estimations based on microeconomic data
5.  The results, however, are 
mixed and cover a wide range of possibilities (Table 1). For Mexico, the 
frequency of wage reductions is 21% during the period 1983-86, while Canada 
shows a frequency between 0.3% and 0.4%. Also, the estimations can change 
substantially between different studies for the same country.  For example, 
Blinder and Choi (1990) find evidence of wages being relatively flexible in the 
U.S., while Altonji and Devereux (1999) conclude that wages are fairly rigid.  
Moreover, even in cases where the same source of information is used, different 
authors reach seemingly contradictory conclusions. McLaughlin (1994 and 1999) 
argues absence of wage rigidities, based on data from the Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics (PSID), while Card and Hyslop (1997) find evidence to the contrary 
with the same data. 
 
A reason for such differences may emerge from the lack of comparability across 
surveys or due to measurement error in data.  To deal with the measurement 
error problem, Gottschalk (2005) corrects the wage reported in the PSID survey 
with an identification of structural breaks procedure, finding that wage 
flexibility is reduced substantially, to the level where it is comparable to the 
estimates obtained directly from administrative information provided by 
individual firms. 
 
As regards to the survey comparability, it is worth mentioning two important 
ongoing initiatives. On the one hand, The International Wage Flexibility 
                                                 
5 Another line of research corresponds to authors like Fortin and Dumont (2001) and Farès and Lemieux (2001) that use 
the Phillips Curve along with alternative aggregate measures of wage growth to infer whether there is some evidence of 
wage inflexibility.  Jadresic (1992) follows a similar approach.   3 
Project (IWFP); a network studying wage rigidities from micro data for 17 
OECD countries, where the preliminary findings suggest the predominance of 
real over nominal rigidities for the European countries as opposed to the US and 
UK (Dickens et al, 2007). On the other hand, The Wage Dynamic Network at 
the European Central Bank (WDN) has recently conducted several surveys 
referring to aspects such as adjustment margins, synchronization of wages and 
prices, among others topics
6, where some of these surveys concluded that wage 
cuts are extremely rare – i.e., downward nominal rigidity
7.  Even though, at this 
point in time the studies show heterogeneous results, initiatives such as the 
IWFP and WDN are a good step towards generating more accurate data to 
analyze the presence, causes and consequences of wage rigidity. 
  
Table 1 
Selected Wage Rigidity Studies 
Study  Period  Annual Frequency of Wage 
Reduction 
México 







Mclaughlin (1994)   
Card and Hyslop (1996) 
Kahn (1997) 
Akerlof et al (1996) 





































Notes: *= information found in Gottschalk (2005). 
                                                 




7 Babecky et al. (2008) shows that only 398 of the 14.122 (2.82%) respondents declared wages were cut during the 
previous five years, which suggest the existence of downward nominal rigidity.    4 
3. Data  
3.1 General Background 
The database consists of the information reported to the ACHS by its affiliated 
companies during the period 2001.12 - 2007.12.  This information is collected 
from payrolls provided by the companies, containing details such as the taxable 
remuneration
8, gender, age, and the firm to which the worker belongs, specifying 
the economic sector at 1 digit classification – i.e., agriculture; mining, 
manufacturing; construction; electricity, gas and water.; commerce; transport; 
and services -. 
 
This data has several advantages over other sources of information.  First, the 
ACHS covers around 35% of wage earning employees and 25% of firms
9.  
Second, the alternative source of information would be the Earnings Survey of 
the National Institute of Statistics (INE), which reports only business level 
information - basically, total wage cost and number of employees - and hence 
does not allow a direct approach for assessing labour market flexibility. Third, 




The most important limitation of the dataset is the lack of information on hours 
worked, which means that it is not possible to isolate wage changes from 
changes in working hours.  Second, wage reporting is limited by the maximum 
taxable monthly income, so wages are truncated at an upper bound.  This limit 
was set at US$ 2.300 per month in December 2007
11, which, according to wage 
distribution surveys would exclude roughly 5% of Chilean workers. Third, the 
database only has information from those workers belonging to affiliated 
companies, which limits the possibility of exploring the flow of workers. Taking 
all this into account, we believe that even though the information of the ACHS 
                                                 
8 The taxable remuneration includes all remuneration that an employee receives, including the basic salary, commissions, 
bonuses, contributions for transport, etc. 
9 Based on information from the Inland Revenue Service. The representativity for firms with 10 workers or more is 
slightly over 35%
 
10 Aravena (2006) finds that problems like repetition of identical information from a single worker within the same 
period or incomplete reporting, among others, are not significant for general purposes – for years 2002-2005-. 
11 This ceiling is set in terms of Unidades de Fomento (UF) - an inflation adjusting measure -.   5 
presents some restrictions that limit its use, they are more than offset by the 
quality and type of information available.   
3.2 Panel Construction 
The original base was filtered due to the presence of certain inconsistencies in 
the data -possibly because of the manual input of information, incomplete 
information
12, the truncated values and the appearance of sporadic workers. 
Specifically, the following cases were excluded from the whole sample:  
 
i)  Workers whose identification number was not unique within the same 
period. 
ii)  Workers with no specified age or gender. 
iii)  Workers over 90 years old and under 15. 
iv)  Workers with wages higher than the maximum taxable income and lower 
than the current minimum wage.  
v)  Workers with wages that match the maximum taxable monthly income 
for more than two consecutive months  
 
Note that criteria (i) to (iv) controls for inconsistencies and partial information 
on available data, while criterion (v) seeks to eliminate those individuals whose 
wages are truncated and could therefore underestimate the actual degree of 
wage flexibility.  We find that on average 3.7% of the worker identification 
numbers appear more than once in the same period. After removing these wage 
histories, the workers that do not comply with the gender and age criteria add 
up to 17% of the original base.  Workers with wages above the maximum and 
under the minimum represent a 2%, while truncated wage histories another 3%.  
Once the data is filtered, following an approach similar to Fehr and Goette 
(2005), the workers who do not comply with a minimum of 24 consecutive 
reported months are excluded.  This final criterion implies dropping 7% of the 
unfiltered sample.  
 
                                                 
12 In cases where there is no wage information, for no longer than three consecutive periods, and after which the worker 
remains working for the same employer, we assume that the worker was employed but that the company had failed to 
report. If the wage doesn’t change after the missing period, we assumed that it didn’t vary during that time. If it does 
change, the wage modification is allocated with uniform probability in the missing time period.   6 
As a result of the previous adjustments, the resulting database consists of an 
average of 336 thousand workers reporting every month. This figure adds up to 
8.6% of wage earning Chilean workers (Table 2). In terms of economic sector 
representation, the manufacturing, electricity, gas and water, and services sector 
have a representation near 10% of the earning workers. The rest of the sectors 
have a representation ranging from 3% to 7%, which allows for a reasonable 
margin of confidence for our estimations. 
 
In terms of the firms contained in the data, the database includes 
approximately 35 thousand firms (Table 3), which, according to information 
from the Inland Revenue Service, would be around 17% of the total registered 
businesses
13.  In terms of distribution by firm size, the participation of small, 
medium and large corresponds to 38%, 57% and 5% of the sample, while the 
coverage of firms by size is 9%, 36% and 35%, respectively.  
 
Table 2 































Total 336,445  8.6 
Notes: (*) Sample Average. (**) Estimation based on published information from 
the National Statistics Institute (Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas).  Elaborated 
from ACHS disaggregate data. 
 
                                                 
13 This is over a all firms with at least one employee   7 
Table 3 
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Database  Firms  35,817 13,551 20,615  1,651 
Database/Total Chilean Firms  16.5%  8.7%  36.0%  34.8% 
Note: Based on Inland Revenue Services and ACHS disaggregate data. 
 
Regarding the sample’s representativity, Table 4 compares sample age and 
gender distribution with the population’s figures published by the National 
Statistics Institute. We find that our sample is not far off from the population’s 
shares when it comes to gender, but young people are under represented. This 
could be reflect the effect of the minimum number of reports criteria, because of 
younger workers change jobs more frequently, so excluding workers with 
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under 30 








Source: National Statistics Institute 
   8 
With respect to wage’s distribution, the sample is upward biased with respect to 
population distribution derived from the Encuesta de Protección Social (Figure 
1). This issue is mainly derived from the database characteristics. The reporting 
firms to AChS belong to the formal sector and, by legal restrictions they can 
not pay wages under the minimum, which implies that our sample is truncated 
at that value.  Instead, the sample population is not bounded bellow.  In this 
sense, the estimations obtained in this study are mostly referred to firms and 
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Source: Population distribution based on the Encuesta de 
Protección Social, Universidad de Chile. 
3.3 Wage Adjustments 
As it was previously mentioned, wages may be subject to measurement errors 
and may also include fluctuations that do not necessarily represent changes in 
wage conditions -for example, one-off bonuses or other transitory elements. Due 
to this, wages are corrected following Gottschalks (2005) approach. The method 
relies on the assumption that nominal wages remain constant for a time and 
only change in a discreet manner, this assumption is implemented through the 
use of the structural break test developed by Bai and Perron (2003).  
   9 
Figure 2 illustrates the application of this methodology. The left panel presents 
an actual wage history from the database and the simulated wage. As can be 
seen, the latter remains fairly close to the original one, while ignoring small 
fluctuations in months 3 and 6. In order to replicate the effect of potential 
bonuses throughout the year, the right panel presents a simulated wage that 
shows a temporary peak. The structural brake methodology, as expected, 




Original and Corrected Wage 










1  3  5  7  9  11  13  15  17 19 21












1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
Corrected Original   
 
The distribution of wages is not changed very notticeably by using Gottschalk’s 
approach. However, it significantly affects the frequency of wage adjustments 
(Figure 3).  Indeed, without adjustment, the frequency of wage changes is more 
or less symmetrical around a number slightly above zero, while the adjusted 
series shows a highly unsymmetrical distribution of changes clearly biased 
towards wage increase. These results impliy that, if the proposed methodology 
were not used, the sample frequency adjustments would reflect a significantly 
greater wage flexibility compared to the one found in the adjusted data, and 
considering the results reported by Gottschalk (2005), ), the unadjusted results 
would most certainly be biased upwards.  
 
                                                 
14 Annex 1 contains a description of the methodology employed.   10 
Figure 3 
Wage Histograms  
Originals 
Level  Annual Change* 
   
 
Adjusted 
Level  Annual Change* 
   
Note: * considers only actual wages changes. 
4. Wage Adjustments in Chile 
4.1 Characterizing the Adjustment Frequency 
Table 5 summarizes the main indicators of wage adjustments in Chile. The 
estimates are divided between those changes not related to a new job – stayers - 
from changes due to a new hire – movers -.  For the first group, the average 
adjustment frequency is 3.66% per month, with the increases and reductions 
being 3.35% and 0.31%, respectively
15. These numbers suggest that the length of 
time required to adjust wages in the economy would be, on average, slightly 
over nine quarters.  This result is close to estimations obtained from a DSGE 
model for Chile, where the average length of adjustment is 12.5 quarters with a 
lower bound of 5.56 quarters at 66% confidence level
16. For those workers 
switching firms, we find that about 34% receive an increase, 24% a reduction 
and about 42% do not see a statistically significant change in their wages. 
                                                 
15 To illustrate the effect of the methodology used – Gottschalk (2005) -, the frequency of wage reductions without 
adjustment is 30.97%, a figure that far escapes the largest of the available estimates (section 2). 
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Table 5 























Note: * Frequency calculated considering the last reported wage in the previous firm. Source: Elaborated from ACHS 
disaggregate data. 
 
The analysis by firm size indicates that mid-size companies have a slightly lower 
adjustment frequency than the others (Table 6). However, the magnitude of 
such differences does not look significant.  Considering the frequency of wage 
reductions as a more direct indicator of wage flexibility, the larger companies 
would be least flexible, followed by medium and small companies.  However, 
these figures must be considered with caution, because these frequencies can be 
influenced not only by the firm’s size but also by worker characteristics.  A 
formal analysis of the incidence of firm and worker characteristics is shown in 
the next section. 
Table 6 









(monthly) (monthly) (monthly) 
Less than 10 Workers  
From 10 to 200 Workers  










Source: Elaborated from ACHS disaggregate data. 
 
Braking down by economic sector indicates some differences across sectors 
(Table 7). With respect to the frequency of adjustments, the services sector and 
construction sector record the highest values in the sample (4.28% and 3.95% 
monthly, respectively), and the manufacturing sector has the lowest adjustment 
frequency (3.11%).  Focusing on wage reductions, it is interesting to note that 
the frequency observed is quite similar across sectors, with the only exception   12 
being construction, which shows nearly twice the overall frequency of wage 
reductions.   
Table 7 
Wage Adjustments in Chile by Economic Sector 
  
Item 








Frequency of  
Reductions 



















































Source: Elaborated from ACHS disaggregate data. 
 
4.2 Determinants of Wage Flexibility: Econometric Approach 
The literature employs both individual and firm characteristics to explain the 
degree of wage rigidity.  Regarding the workforce variables, Campbell and 
Kamlani (1997) emphasise that variables such as the proportion of blue-white 
collar workers or skill levels, among others, are crucial to an understanding of 
labour rigidities
17.  Meanwhile, Messina et al (2008), and Franz and Pfeiffer 
(2006) also consider characteristics like firm size or simply sector fixed effects to 
explain why some firms exhibit different degrees of downward nominal wage 
rigidity. 
 
In terms of workforce characteristics, we have data on the age and gender of 
workers.  The latter was computed as the proportion of female workers in each 
firm.  The worker’s age variable was grouped in two dummy variables: one were 
it takes the value of one if the average worker age lies between 30 and 50 years, 
and the other if the average worker age is over 50 years old. Additionally, as a 
proxy of white collar workers participation, the dataset was complemented with 
                                                 
17 Du Caju et al (2007) also points to the use of this type of variable.   13 
the percentage of workers in each firm with a wage higher than the average 
w a g e  i n  e a c h  p e r i o d .   I n  t e r m s  o f  f i r m  v a r i a b l e s ,  w e  c o n s i d e r  f i r m  s i z e ,  
percentage of unionized workers at economic sector level and we control by the 
economic sector to which each firm belongs
18.   
 
We run a set of regressions where the dependent variable is the percentage of 
workers in each firm that exhibit a wage reduction each period
19, and the 
explanatory variables are those mentioned above.  Notice that the dependent 
variable is restricted to the interval [0,1], therefore, the ordinary least square 
procedure is not appropriate because the predicted values may lie outside this 



















    ( 1 )  
where  it y is the percentage of workers that exhibit a wage cut in firm i,  it w  is a 
set of worker characteristics in firm i, and  it f  represents firm characteristics. 
 
The data covers on a quarterly basis the period 2001-2007.  Table 7 presents the 
marginal effects on the dependent variable – i.e., percentage of wage cuts. 
Regarding worker characteristics, there is a negative relationship between the 
share of female workers and wage flexibility.  This result may be suggesting that 
firms avoid wage cuts because women are less attached to the labour market
20 - 
i.e., they are more likely to quit in the presence of wage reductions.  The 
worker’s age variables show that firms with older workers exhibit higher 
flexibility, with a similar coefficient for workers between 30 and 50 years old, 
and workers over 50
21.  This result and the previous one are consistent with 
insider-outsider models, where younger and female workers play an outsider 
role
22. Regarding the worker skill measurement, we obtained a positive 
                                                 
18 We do not have more detailed economic sector classification to account for a higher firm heterogeneity. 
19 We only include stayers, but the results are robust to changing the dependent variable to wage cuts of all workers – 
stayers and movers -. 
20 This is consistent with an anti-cyclical participation of women in labor market. 
21 The marginal effects of this variable and the others are robust to the use of age as a continuous variable - both its 
level and its squared value -. 
22 Insider-outsider theory considers that firms do not dismiss their current workers (insiders) and hire the unemployed 
(outsiders) at a lower wage because of the cost of hiring and training new workers.  Messina (2008) points out this kind 
of explanation for similar results.   14 
relationship between wage flexibility and the share of white-collar workers, 
which could be indicating that contracts for skilled workers are relatively more 




The Determinants of Downward Nominal Reduction 
Dependent Variable: Wage Cuts Percentage at Firm Level 
Marginal Effects 
Variable [1]  [2]  [3]  [4] 
Female Employment Share 
Age>30 & Age ≤50 
Age>50 
Firm size: 1-10 
Firm size: 10-200 
Share of white-collars  
































Electricity, Gas and Water  
Commerce 
Transport 

































Time Effect   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Note: All significant at a 1% level except: **=5% significance. *= 10% significance. 
NS= not significant at 10%. 
 
Regarding firm characteristics, small and medium-sized firms have higher wage 
rigidity (with less than 200 workers).  An explanation for this result may be 
related to the fact that large firms may be able to apply more complex payment 
schemes allowing more flexible salaries.  Complementary to this, especially in 
the case of small firms, these firms could try to avoid cutting wages because, if a 
couple of workers decide to quit due to a wage cut, the relative incidence is 
higher for small firms than for bigger ones –i.e., small firms face potentially 
higher adjustment costs.  The level of union membership does not seem to be 
statistically relevant.  Finally, the estimated sector fixed effect indicates that 
construction and services have higher flexibility than the other economic 
                                                 
23 This result is at odds with efficiency wage models, because it should be more difficult to monitor skilled workers than 
unskilled workers.   15 
sectors, while Commerce and Electricity, Gas and Water have the lowest 
frequency of wage cuts
24. 
 
4.3. Effect of Downward Nominal Rigidity on Employment 
In order to check the relationship of wage rigidity to employment more 
formally, we ran a set of regressions relating employment growth by firm to 
sector growth – i.e., GDP by sector – and wage flexibility of each firm.  Table 9 
summarises our estimations.  Column [1] indicates that a positive shock of 1% of 
annual growth would imply an employment growth of 0.3%. However, if we 
control by the degree of wage flexibility (Cols. [2] and [3]), the sensitivity of 
employment to sector growth would be lower in firms with higher wage 




This finding is consistent with the view that lack of wage flexibility will 
generate cost in terms of employment, where firms with high wage flexibility 
can absorb shocks through adjustment in wages instead of employment.  More 
specifically, in the case of a negative shock, if firms cannot adjust wages, they 
will be forced to fire workers - or shut down in an extreme case.  On the other 
hand, if the shock is positive - i.e., high GDP growth -, firms with higher wage 
rigidity will increase employment relativ e l y  m o r e  t h a n  f i r m s  w i t h  h i g h  w a g e  
flexibility.  It is worth mentioning that even in the case of total absence of 
upward wage rigidity during periods of high growth, the presence of downward 
nominal rigidity has effects on employment cyclicality, because of the threat of 
future negative shocks and the need to rehire the workers fired during the 
previous low growth episode. 
 
To illustrate the previous point numerically, Table 10 presents a simulation of 
the impact on employment derived from a positive and negative growth shock.  
The positive shock is equal to a growth 1% over the historical average and the 
negative shock is 1% below the average.  We considered the following cases: a) 
                                                 
24 The non-linearity of the model implies that the marginal effect of the sector dummy can not be isolated completely.  
25 The asymmetry of the coefficients shown in Column [3] could suggest that firms have to make bigger efforts in order 
to adjust for negative shocks, which could be consistent with the existence of credit constraints to firms during bad 
times.  However, we do not have data to check this point formally.   16 
low flexibility corresponds to zero wage reduction, and b) high flexibility 
corresponds to the 97.5% highest adjustment frequency and it is equal to 
13.15% per month.  In the case of an increase of 1%, the quarterly employment 
growth would fluctuate from 0.35% to 0.26%, and if the shock were negative, 
the employment growth would range from -0.35% to -0.20%. 
 
Table 9 
Dependent Variable: Quarterly Employment Growth 
Variable [1]  [2]  [3] 
Sector Growth t 
Sector Growth x Percentage of Wage Cuts t 
Low Sector Growth x Percentage of Wage Cuts t 















Note: Low (high) sector growth is defined as the cases when GDP growth is lower (higher) than the average GDP 
growth of each sector. All values are significant at a 1% level, except for **= significant at 5%. 
 
Table 10 
Employment Consequences of Downward Nominal Reduction 
Quarterly Employment Growth 









This paper characterises the wage adjustment dynamic in Chile based on 
microeconomic data using a panel of 440 thousand work histories for the period 
2001.12-2007.12.  The main result indicates that the frequency of wage 
adjustments in Chile is approximately 3.7% per month, with just 0.31% 
corresponding to wage reductions. 
 
The frequency and magnitude of wage adjustments show some differences across 
economic sectors.  In particular, sectors such as construction and services 
exhibit a relatively greater frequency, while manufacturing would have the 
lowest. However, the frequency of wage reductions does not vary significantly 
between economic sectors, with the exception of the construction sector, which   17 
virtually doubles the estimated frequency in other sectors. This could reflect the 
fact that construction activities are dominated by temporary projects. 
 
The econometric analysis of the determinants of downward nominal wage 
rigidity indicates that both employee and firm characteristics are relevant.   
Regarding worker characteristics, firms with a high concentration of female, 
younger and unskilled workers will face a lower degree of wage flexibility and 
viceversa.  On the firm’s side, small and medium-sized firms exhibit a lower 
degree of downward flexibility, which could be explained by more complex 
payment schemes in big firms. 
 
Finally, concerning the consequences of downward rigidity, our estimations 
indicate that the degree of wage rigidity has higher employment fluctuations as 
a counterpart.  This kind of effect is especially relevant when activity is growing 
below the historical average.  In fact, if growth were 1% less than average, 
employment would decrease 0.35% at the extreme case of zero flexibility, while 
it would decrease 0.20% if the firm had a high degree of flexibility. 
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Annex 1 
Methodology Bai-Perron (2003) 
 
 
This annex presents a description of the structural break test used to determine 
the change in wages. For a more rigorous analysis and presentation of this test, 
see Bai-Perron (2003).  
 
Defining  T as the number of periods for which wages are observed for a 
particular worker, existing m structural breaks that occur in T1, T2..... Tm. The 
wages observed in the period is equal to a constant () plus a measurement error 
() as specified below:  
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 (A.1)   
 
Bai and Perron (2003) have proposed a OLS estimator for β's and T's. For this 
purpose, they assume that the number of breaks is known and equal to m. In 
this case, the idea is to estimate β's and T's that minimize the residuals sum of 
the squares of the System A.1. However, this calculation can be quite 
demanding computationally, since the duration between breaks is unknown and 
therefore there are many combinations for T's. To deal with this problem, Bai 
and Perron (2003) show that the problem can be reduced via dynamic 
programming, as follows:  
 
   ) ˆ ( min ) ˆ ,.., ˆ ( ~ ) ˆ ,.., ˆ ( ~
ˆ 1 1 1 m T m m T SSR T T R S S T T R S S
m
+ = −    (A.2)  
 
The algorithm is solved recursively according to the following procedure. 
Calculate the SSR for the T – 2h possible breaks that divide the T observations 
in 2 segments of a  minimum length h. Choose the break point with minimum   22 
SSR between these T – 2h break points. Take the two remaining segments and 
repeat until you have m segments. This will return a minimum SSR on all 
possible combinations of m breaks of a minimum length h.  
 
To determine the optimal m we use a sequential process. First, the sample is 
divided in two and the null hypothesis of no structural break is tested using an 
F test of the SSR with and without structural break. In the event that the null 
hypothesis is rejected, the remaining segment is divided in two and then tested 
for structural break in both segments. This procedure is repeated until the null 
hypothesis cannot be rejected. 
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